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1. Introduction 
Since the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, the citizens of Europe have seen a stark increase 
in the Europeanisation of security. Accordingly, with the removal of the EU’s internal borders, 
threats towards national security are now increasingly seen as threats to the entire European Union 
as the separation between internal and external security is increasingly transcended. This has led to 
new and wide-ranging policies and initiatives at the European level, in order to tackle the 
perceived security threat terrorism poses to national and European security. As a result of several 
successful and failed attacks within Europe by EU citizens, the perceived threat of violent 
extremism, homegrown terrorism and radicalisation has become a central area of focus at both the 
national and European level. The perceived threat of terrorism and radicalisation is used and 
perpetuated by national and European professionals of politics in advocating for increased 
Europeanisation of security. While the professionals of security seek to pool power and influence 
in managing this threat within the security field. This has led to a proliferation of policies and 
initiatives targeting this perceived threat and extending EU control over its citizens, through mass 
surveillance, CC TV, increased border controls, Internet surveillance and the creation of suspect 
communities within the borders of Europe, as specific groups of society are deemed as being ‘at 
risk’ (Breen-Smyth 2014: 229-230). This framing of suspect communities has led to policies and 
initiatives policing and surveilling minorities within society rather than policies targeting all 
citizens in the pursuit of the perceived security threat. The EU has over the years sought to 
establish itself as a key actor in the fight against terrorism. Furthermore within the EU, the 
European Police (Europol) has since its establishment sought to extend its role within European 
security and more significantly since 9/11 pursued a position as an indispensable actor in counter-
terrorism. Yet, Europol has continuously faced significant challenges in gaining the trust and 
support of national security agencies and the EU Member States (MSs) for its role in security and 
in gaining their trust and support for its participation and in accepting Europol as an agency within 
counter-terrorism (Busuioc & Groenleer 2013: 289-290; Sablattnig 2015). Despite of becoming an 
agency under the EU in 2009 and continued calls by both national and European professionals of 
politics for Europol’s position in European security and in counter-terrorism, this has not led to 
significant practical support for Europol by other agencies within the security field (Carrapiço & 
Trauner 2013: 357). These agencies have consistently prioritised horizontal cooperation and 
bilateral structures amongst nations and other actors, above the vertical framework present within 
Europol. This has resulted in constraints and limitations on the achievements of Europol in 
counter-terrorism, as a consequence of its weak mandate and the voluntary nature it entails in 
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terms of MSs participation. On the grounds of its mandate, limited resources and limited agency 
support, Europol faces a considerable challenge in ensuring its position in the security field. 
Europol has consistently sought to establish a demand for its position in counter-terrorism and 
have highlighted its potential as a centre for expertise and as a secure and significant forum for 
pursuing counter-terrorism. In promoting its indispensability and in seeking to ensure the support 
of individual MSs, it is seeking to establish its relevance despite of the challenges it faces. Yet, 
this is not an easy task for Europol, as its options are limited by the field, national initiatives in 
counter-radicalisation and the lack of national agency support for an extension of its role in 
counter-radicalisation. Therefore, establishing itself as a central security agency requires the 
promotion of particular security threats and solutions to these threats that would be considered of 
value for the professionals of politics and other agencies in the field.  
In managing the issue of radicalisation, the EU and most MSs largely agree on the main areas of 
concern. Most MSs have focused on issues concerning integration, domestic socialisation, 
increasing democratic understanding and community dialogue in countering this aspect of 
terrorism (Vidino & Brandon 2012: 50-51; see also HM Government 2011; Government of 
Denmark 2009). Yet, another policy area, which has in recent years gained growing attention, is 
the role of the Internet as a tool for terrorism in recruitment, propaganda and terrorist financing, as 
well as, as a catalyst for radicalisation. Some of the largest EU MSs have pursued this as a 
component of their counter-radicalisation strategies, though most states have prioritised the before 
mentioned areas of concern. For instance, both Germany and the United Kingdom have 
implemented independent initiatives to target radical information online with the Check the Web 
initiative and the UK Counter-Terrorism Internet Referral Unit respectively (Council of the 
European Union 2007: 3; Nouri & Whiting 2015: 175-178). Yet, despite of these efforts to tackle 
the role of the Internet in radicalisation has remained a secondary policy area at both the national 
and EU level, as MSs prioritise community-based concerns as the key cause and issue of 
radicalisation (Klausen 2009: 407; Vidino & Brandon 2012: 18). 
In the immediate aftermath of the Charlie Hebdo attacks in Paris on 7 January 2015, the EU and 
Europol announced its intention to establish an EU Internet Referral Unit within Europol and for 
the agency to take on a central role in policing and surveilling the Internet in countering 
radicalisation at the European level (Europol 2015d). Thus, despite MSs preference for national 
strategies in counter-radicalisation overall and the mostly limited focus on the role of the Internet 
in causing radicalisation, Europol is seeking to advance its role within the security field on this 
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specific aspect of radicalisation. Nevertheless, the Europol Work Programme 2015 published in 
the days of the Paris attacks, makes no mention of Europol seeking to pursue any such effort on 
the Internet in countering radicalisation (Europol 2015a). The Work Programme for 2015, which 
is to be approved by the Europol Management Board, consisting of representatives from MSs and 
the EU, establishes the possible policies and initiatives Europol can pursue within its mandate. 
Yet, it solely mentions the Internet in regards to financial crime, Europol’s Cybercrime Centre and 
in addressing child sex abuse online (Europol 2015a). Although Europol has increasingly 
indicated the emerging threat of the Internet in terrorism within its yearly threat assessments, this 
was not openly pursued in operational terms. Hence, no mention is made about the possibility to 
extend Europol’s capabilities in countering radicalisation online within the Work Programme. Yet 
with the momentum of the Paris attacks, this soon followed. Only three weeks later, the Joint Riga 
Statement by the EU Ministers of Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) Council makes the first 
mention of the idea of an EU Internet Referral Unit under Europol to tackle the threat of the 
Internet in radicalisation (Ministers of Justice and Home Affairs Council 2015). Soon after, 
Europol was given the lead in developing such an initiative within its structures with the support 
of MSs and aimed to come into force as of 1 July 2015 (Europol 2015d). The decision to enhance 
the capabilities and mandate on the role of the Internet within Europol presents an interesting 
puzzle on the development of Europol and what has led to this new threat prioritisation. A policy 
not requested or demanded by individual MSs, not a key priority in any MSs and not openly 
pursued prior to the Paris attacks, yet in the aftermath now considered a key policy area for 
Europol. Europol with its limited mandate, limited capabilities, lack of power to conduct its own 
operations and remaining a voluntary supplementary component for police cooperation faces a 
major challenge in sustaining its position and ensuring continued support for its evolving role 
within the security field. The development of an EU IRU could ultimately extend the mandate and 
position of Europol in the field, depending on the support of MSs and agencies for this new 
initiative within Europol. Hence, this thesis seeks to answer the following research question: “Why 
is Europol spearheading the creation of an EU Internet Referral Unit?” 
In the following section, a necessary background on the thesis topic is provided. In the subsequent 
chapter 2, a review of the relevant literature will be presented. Consequently, Chapter 3 will give 
an overview of the theoretical framework, followed by the research design in Chapter 4. Chapter 
5.1 will provide an analysis of the impact of the field on Europol. In Chapter 5.2, an in-depth 
analysis of the notion of the Ban-Opticon Dispositif will be provided, in relations to the 
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legitimisation of the IRU, the recent developments within Europol and the consequences of the 
creation of suspect communities. This will be followed up by the conclusion, limitations and 
recommendations for further research in Chapter 6. 
1.1 Background 
Since the early 1970s, a coordinated European effort against terrorism has slowly evolved, initially 
solely in bilateral and multilateral structures, yet in the last couple of decades the European Union 
has taken on a greater role in this field. After several high-profile terrorism incidences in the 
1970s, such as the 1972 Munich Olympic Games, calls for collective European action against 
terrorism emerged (Hassan 2010: 446). The first consolidated European effort was the so-called 
TREVI framework established in 1975 of a loose intergovernmental cooperation without any legal 
powers or permanent institutional structures (Ibid.). Yet, this became the starting point for the 
initial development of European police cooperation and counter-terrorism efforts. The 
development of Europol was founded on this early initiative, alongside other institutional 
developments with the implementation of the Maastricht Treaty in 1992 (European Union 1992). 
Since 11 September 2001, the EU’s counter-terrorism efforts has expanded exponentially in line 
with the increased degree of political integration within Europe and the international security field. 
Several terrorist attacks and threats within Europe, particularly with the 2004 Madrid bombings, 
the 2005 London attacks, threats in the Netherlands and most recently the attacks in Paris and 
Copenhagen in January and February 2015, have driven political integration on security within 
Europe (Coolsaet 2013: 9-12; Bossong 2013b). The EU has developed policies and structures, 
such as the EU Counter-terrorism Coordinator, the EEAS to handle the external component of its 
counter-terrorism, and efforts within Europol and Eurojust in the pooling of MSs capabilities, 
information and power to tackle the issue of terrorism (Monar 2015: 343-343). Yet, it has 
struggled to achieve significant strides in the pooling of efforts, as most MSs continue to regard 
the issue of terrorism, security and intelligence as a predominantly national undertaking (Ibid.). 
Hence, the extent and significance of the EU’s counter-terrorism efforts is constrained by a lack of 
authority over counter-terrorism efforts in Europe and the strong diversity of initiatives and 
policies in counter-terrorism and counter-radicalisation at the national level. 
Nevertheless, in December 2005, the EU’s first Counter-Terrorism Strategy set out four main 
headings tackling the issue of terrorism with ‘Prevent’ (tackling causes of radicalisation and 
terrorist recruitment), ‘Protect’ (critical infrastructure and protection of citizens), ‘Pursue’ 
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(investigation and pursuit of terrorists across borders) and ‘Respond’ (against the repercussions of 
attacks and increasing coordination) (Council of the European Union 2005c). Several legislative 
and operational developments followed the counter-terrorism strategy. Of importance for the 
present undertaking, the focus on ‘Prevent’ and tackling radicalisation and terrorist recruitment is 
at the heart of Europol’s new undertaking. The Prevent component aims to identify and combat 
“the methods, propaganda and instruments terrorist uses” and to address challenges of 
socialisation, cultural integration and lack of political and economic prospects for the domestic 
youths ‘vulnerable’ to radicalisation (Bakker 2015: 290; Council of the European Union 2005c). 
Preventive counterterrorism and countering radicalisation is a contentious practice (Bossong 2014: 
67). The concept of radicalisation is highly contested and a commonly accepted definition does 
not exist within the EU. Radicalisation is argued to describe “what goes on before the bomb goes 
off”, yet the definitions used by both the EU and individual MSs differs in correlation with their 
chosen counter-radicalisation policies and initiatives (Sedgwick 2010: 479). The EU has 
increasingly advanced its role in counter-radicalisation and considers this a key priority (European 
Commission 2010; Bakker 2015: 281). For Europol, its counter-radicalisation efforts has up to this 
point been limited to combating terrorist financing and facilitating the sharing of information and 
intelligence between police and intelligence services, as this is the most logical area for a 
police/intelligence agency of its nature(Hillebrand 2011: 501). Yet, its new development towards 
targeting the role of the Internet is moving beyond this starting point. 
A significant increase in the use of the concept of radicalisation grew in the aftermath of the 2005 
London bombings and most MSs established national counter-radicalisation programs (Sedgwick 
2010: 480). Yet, these are immensely diverse and tailored to the particular situation of the specific 
national or local needs. Some countries have faced significant threats or major terrorist attacks, 
while others have not. This has led to a great deal of diversity in the policies pursued. The 
Netherlands has for example not faced large scale attacks, such as the U.K. or Spain, yet has dealt 
with crises relating to extremism, radicalisation and terrorism and targeted attacks (Butt & Tuck 
2014: 3). As a consequence, the Netherlands has emphasised social cohesion and improvement of 
integration and socialisation in its counter-radicalisation efforts (Ministerie van Binnenlandse 
Zaken en Koninkrijksrelaties 2007: 5). This includes efforts to identify vulnerable youths, policies 
of integration and establishing counter-narratives to radical propaganda (Ministerie van 
Binnenlandse Zaken en Koninkrijksrelaties 2007; Demant & de Graaf 2010: 410). Denmark has 
deployed similar efforts to target social integration through community dialogue, as well as 
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targeted deradicalisation efforts (Government of Denmark 2009; Butt & Tuck 2014: 16). Germany 
has also engaged with interfaith and religious-political dialogue, improving integration, counter-
narratives and deradicalisation projects (Butt & Tuck 2014: 20). The United Kingdom has since 
the London attacks in 2005 been increasingly concerned with domestic radicalisation and has 
pursued a comprehensive counter-radicalisation policy known as Prevent since 2008 (House of 
Commons 2009: 3). Policies under Prevent has included supporting third-sector organisations in 
support of countering extremism and promoting democratic principles at the local level (HM 
Government 2011: 7). These policies and initiatives have predominantly been community-focused 
on improving communication with Muslim communities and of community policing (Home 
Office 2005; Klausen 2009: 408; Vidino & Brandon 2012: 20). The initiatives pursued by most 
MSs have thus largely been concerned with community-based challenges and policies to target 
localised concerns of radicalisation within domestic ‘suspect’ communities, mostly concerning 
muslim minorities. 
Nevertheless, both Germany and the U.K. have also pursued policies to counter the role of the 
Internet in “facilitating radicalisation and recruitment” and the promotion of ideological 
propaganda (Butt & Tuck 2014: 12). Germany launched an initiative known as Check the Web in 
2007 to "store comprehensive information on persons, objects and activities" of suspicious 
activities online, initially initiated by the German Federal Criminal Police Office (Council of the 
European Union 2007: 5-6; Hunko et al. 2015). This has since been developed into a European 
project under Europol on a voluntary basis for the participation of individual MSs. Furthermore, in 
2010, the U.K. launched its Counter-Terrorism Internet Referral Unit to remove “unlawful 
internet content”, support the police counter-terrorism network in investigating and prosecuting 
terrorist or radicalising activity, and act on referrals from citizens and public bodies (von Behr et 
al. 2013: 4; Nouri & Whiting 2015: 176-177). Yet, neither of these countries nor other MSs 
pursuing national counter-radicalisation policies have placed Internet radicalisation at the top of 
their national counter-radicalisation agendas. Though both Germany and the U.K., as well as some 
other MSs have pursued national initiatives on the Internet in radicalisation, this remains a 
secondary priority next to socialisation, integration and deradicalisation. Nevertheless, Europol is 
placing the Internet on the top of its counter-radicalisation agenda. Europol maintains other 
capabilities and projects within the field of counter-terrorism, such as the Check the Web project, 
yearly threat assessment reports (TE-SAT), facilitating the exchange of information and providing 
expertise and technical support for EU-wide investigations (Bures 2008: 501). Yet, as all of these 
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are on a voluntary basis in terms of MSs support and in the sharing of information by other 
agencies for its threat assessments, Europol is facing a significant challenge in establishing its 
indispensability for EU counter-terrorism and counter-radicalisation in the field. 
Some context on Europol and its role within the European field of security is necessary, before 
moving forward. Europol is best understood as a formal international police cooperation network 
due to its somewhat complex liaison system, including Europol Liaison Officers (ELOs) seconded 
from EU MSs national police and intelligence authorities as well as from non-EU MSs and other 
international organisations, such as Interpol (Hillebrand 2011: 503; Rozée 2011: 446). Europol is 
thus staffed predominantly with professionals of security. Europol’s headquarters is located in The 
Hague and contain in addition to the ELOs, police and law enforcement staff, customs and 
intelligence staff and academic and practical experts within the areas of cybercrime, terrorism, and 
financial crime (Europol 2014a: 10-11). Europol was initially created as a top-down structure by 
the EU with limited operations from 1994 and in full activity in 1999, where it was tasked to 
support and strengthen the law enforcement authorities of MSs and “their mutual cooperation in 
preventing and combating organised crime, terrorism and other forms of serious crime” (Rozée et 
al 2013: 373; European Union 1992). As a result of the top-down creation of Europol by the EU, 
rather than as a bottom-up development by national police and intelligence agencies, Europol has 
faced significant challenges since then in situating itself within the security field (Fägersten 2010: 
504). Europol depends on the support of the EU and MSs for approving its activities and funding 
its budget (Busuioc & Groenleer 2013: 290; den Boer et al. 2008: 111). As such, Europol is 
dependent on the trust from the MSs in its expertise, capabilities and in its representation of threats 
and security. Europol is increasingly seeking to reposition itself, as an independent actor from 
initially simply supporting the efforts of MSs, towards acting on its own accord in prioritising 
threats and establishing independent operational capabilities within the field on this policy issue 
(Occhipinti 2015: 239-240). Yet, increased integration in European police cooperation is an 
ongoing process within the field of security (den Boer 2014: 60). Difference of opinion remains 
amongst MSs, with some advocating an expansion of Europol’s powers, particularly of an 
operational nature, while others retain the need for its coordinating, yet solely supplementary role 
in security (Busuioc & Groenleer 2013: 289). Initially, Europol did not actively seek to promote 
its added value to national investigations and capabilities, which is by some, argued to have 
backfired for the agency in the long-run (Busuioc & Groenleer 2013: 292). Its failure to 
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adequately promote its indispensability to MSs led to continued preference of other forums for the 
exchange of intelligence and information (Ibid.).  
Europol is now prorating the Internet threat in counter-terrorism and counter-radicalisation. On 12 
March 2015, the Council of Ministers agreed on the development of an EU IRU by July 1st 2015 
under Europol (Europol 2015d). As, the IRU is still in the developing stages, its final setup and the 
overall support from individual MSs is still too early to conclude upon. The IRU will be tasked 
with coordinating and sharing the identification tasks (flagging) of terrorist and extremist content 
online, carrying out and supporting Internet referrals in cooperation with the Internet Industry, and 
providing strategic and operational analysis in support of national agencies (Europol 2015d). The 
IRU is developed by Europol in cooperation with MSs, the Commission and other involved 
agencies (Council of the European Union 2015b). Nevertheless, Europol is taking the lead role in 
developing the initiative and in establishing its key features, setup and in framing the threats 
within counter-radicalisation in Europe. The IRU will further monitor and remove online content 
deemed to promote terrorism and violence and to create effective counter-narratives to tackle 
radicalisation (Council of the European Union 2015a). The IRU is thus targeting suspect 
communities within the EU “at risk” of radicalisation. The threat of the Internet is prioritised by 
Europol in developing this initiative to target the threat, despite limited focus on this issue by other 
agencies within the field nor by the professionals of politics prior to the Charlie Hebdo attacks in 
January 2015. Answering the central research question will thus seek to understand what has led 
to Europol’s recent prioritisation of the role of the Internet in radicalisation and for the pre-
existing conditions and legitimising factors within the security field accounting for this 
development.    
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2. Literature Review 
Since September 11, 2001, there has been a proliferation of research on counter-terrorism and 
counter-radicalisation in general and in this context also on the role of Europol within the security 
field. This literature review will address four key components of the literature relevant to the 
present research project. Firstly, the academic literature on EU counter-terrorism and counter-
radicalisation will be addressed, followed by the literature on Europol’s role in the security field 
and what the present literature argues to account for its development. Finally, the literature on the 
specific issue of policing the Internet will be addressed to account for the different accounts of its 
perceived threat in radicalisation. 
EU Counter-terrorism  
The EU has over the years become an increasingly significant actor within counter-terrorism. 
Increased cooperation has occurred and independent institutions and bureaucratic structures have 
been established in targeting terrorism and radicalisation, most notably in intelligence sharing and 
cooperation through Europol. Bossong (2013b) argues that the counter-terrorism efforts and 
increased integration in the field has evolved, as a consequence of its ‘event-driven’ nature in 
response to 9/11, the Madrid attacks, the London bombings and terrorist threats around Europe. 
He accounts for the role of significant securitisation and threat discourses in extending the powers 
and policies within the EU’s counter-terrorism efforts and strengthening the structures of the EU. 
The event-driven nature has also had a significant impact on Europol’s role in counter-terrorism 
and in the increased call for pooling power, resources, intelligence by the political elite for the 
agency. Europol has since it infancy continuously evolved and expanded its capabilities and 
perceived role mostly in the immediate aftermath of both internal and external terrorist attacks and 
threats. 
Coolsaet (2013) supports the ‘event-driven’ nature argument and takes it even further, by arguing 
that political integration at the EU level of counter-terrorism is the direct result of crises and a 
sense of insecurity in the face of terrorism. He highlights how the Official European discourse on 
terrorism has evolved and the official emphasis on the threat terrorism poses to “the European way 
of life and its values” (2013: 4). This discursive construction of the terrorist threat played a part in 
streamlining policies and mechanisms at the EU level in the face of terrorism around Europe 
(Coolsaet 2013: 9-12). The event-driven nature of policymaking is argued to have led to the 
relinquishing of fundamental civil liberties beyond what most would have “thought achievable and 
desirable” prior to this promotion of this threat narrative (Coolsaet 2013: 13). Yet, he does not go 
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beyond the professionals of politics’ role in framing and legitimising polices and does not engage 
with the effects of bureaucratic structures and the professionals of security’s influence on the 
framing of the threat of terrorism and in producing policy solutions. Rather than solely an event-
driven nature of the Europeanisation of security, these structures and professionals of security 
facilitate the production of policies through defining what is and is not a threat in any given 
context. The impact of discourse in framing and reframing the threats to security and in providing 
policy solutions to counter these threats is crucial to comprehending how policies are produced, 
legitimized and implemented.  
The perception of the terrorist threat in policy formation and in the justification and legitimization 
of policies remains an evolving aspect of the counter-terrorism literature. Bures (2011) argues that 
“perceptions of relevant security threats have important ramifications for the preferred set of 
policy responses” and that “perceptions of the terrorist threat therefore clearly represent an 
important variable in the fight against terrorism” at both the MSs and EU levels (Bures 2011: 31). 
He argues that the political elite and professionals of security within the field have “contributed, 
whether deliberately or unintentionally, to public anxiety about terrorism through their public 
communication and legislative initiatives” (Bures 2011: 45). Further the creation of an 
“emergency discourse” and the exaggeration of the terrorist threat have been used for instrumental 
and strategic reasons within the EU’s  and Europol’s official communication (Bures 2008: 45). 
The perceptions of the terrorist threat from both a political elite perspective and from the 
professionals of security is considered of crucial importance in analysing the development of 
Europol’s role within the security field and in developing new counter-radicalisation efforts.  
Radicalisation and counter-radicalisation 
The academic literature on the processes of radicalisation and what factors may be a prerequisite 
for radicalisation has evolved significantly over recent years. Rather, focus has largely been on a 
solution-focused track in analysing counter-radicalisation policies and efforts across Europe. 
Lindekilde (2012) addresses the fundamental and often neglected issue of defining radicalisation 
and so-called violent extremism within the making of counter-radicalisation policies in Europe. He 
engages with the perceived growth of ‘homegrown terrorism’ and meticulously address the 
process of radicalisation, before diving into an analysis of the effectiveness of counter-
radicalisation policies. He addresses the wide scope of policies across MSs, both in terms of 
preventive focus, scope and target group, as a result of different MSs notions of the causes of 
radicalisation (2012: 337). Lindekilde argues for the importance for policymaking in addressing 
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the core issues of radicalisation over “imagined logics” of policy vs. radicalisation and finally the 
issue of discursive presentation of policies, targeting specific groups of society and problematising 
suspect communities on religion and culture, rather than those few individuals going down the 
path of radicalisation (2012: 240). The concept of radicalisation is said to be utilised to encompass 
all components assumed to lead to terrorism and violent radicalisation and further to frame threats 
within society and promoting suspect communities in creating policies aimed to target these 
perceived threats. 
Counter-radicalisation has become a policy field of its own. The notion of radicalisation and the 
perceived possibility of countering terrorism through targeting radicalisation, perpetuates a 
particular type of threat and suspicious communities within MSS and the EU. The fear of 
homegrown terrorists and domestic developments towards terrorism leads to policies and actions 
within the EU targeting citizens and communities, not based on acts or actual threats of terrorism, 
but rather the perceived threat of radicalisation. Heath-Kelly (2013) argues that the concept of 
radicalisation is perpetuated as a 'more-or- less cohesive project of risk knowledge' which is 
pursued to 'render terrorism pre-emptively governable’ (395). She argues in regards to the British 
Prevent strategy, that these counter-radicalisation policies are deployed to 'govern the conduct of 
subjects that it understands as 'risky', but also those it considers 'at risk of becoming risky', using 
knowledge about radicalisation to perform counter-terrorism' (397). The pre-emptive nature of 
these types of counter-terrorism policies thus lead to the promotion of suspect communities. The 
framing of at-risk communities has aided the proliferation of security practices like mass 
surveillance, CC TV and Internet policies targeting radicalisation within the borders of the EU. It 
further indicates the deployment of policies and measures beyond the scope of reason, as what is 
considered a threat is decided by those agencies who also produce the policies targeting the 
threats. 
The role of Europol 
The evolution of police cooperation within Europe, and more specifically for the role of  Europol 
and its new endeavours in counter-radicalisation, within the security field is the focus of this 
thesis. Bures (2008) argues, that Europol continues to lack trust by national law-enforcement and 
intelligence agencies and that a major challenge exists for Europol, as MSs prefer horizontal 
cooperation for information sharing and coordination of efforts above the vertical structure of 
Europol (Bures 2008: 498, 509-510). The evolution of Europol since the early 1970s has yet to 
result in moving beyond a voluntary set-up for the participation of MSs in its efforts, which 
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weakens its perceived importance in counter-terrorism and counter-radicalisation from a national 
perspective (Bures 2008: 499). The lack of an actual executive police force and autonomous 
supranational authority, provides Europol with a secondary, marginal and dispensable role in 
comparison to other agencies and bilateral cooperations for MSs (Bures 2008: 501). The extension 
of Europol’s mandate and actual competences and power from the EU and its MSs is conditioned 
on establishing an indispensable role for Europol, compared to horizontal structures, which would 
increase national support and the perception of the utility of Europol in the field. Busuioc & 
Groenleer further indicate the significant hindrance of the varying degree of support for the 
expansion of Europol’s mandate and role in the field (2013: 289). In response to terrorist attacks 
and threats, MSs and EU professionals of politics have advocated greater cooperation in 
intelligence and law enforcement through Europol (Busuioc & Groenleer 2013: 292). Yet, a 
significant gap exist between the statements of professionals of politics and the willingness of 
national police agencies in cooperating with Europol (Ibid.). This has created a paradox for 
Europol in order to showcase its added value in counter-terrorism, as long as its mandate and 
authority is constrained from demanding the sufficient pooling of power, information and 
knowledge necessary to fully achieve this (Busuioc & Groenleer 2013: 292).  
Carrapiço & Trauner (2013) seek to contribute to the literature on Europol and specifically on the 
‘actorness’ of Europol in the field. Europol is argued to have more recently positioned itself as a 
platform for the Europeanization of interests and policies and to have continuously sought to 
establish a role for itself beyond its initial powers and mandate within the field (Carrapiço & 
Trauner 2013: 368). Rozée et al. (2013) support the claim for Europol’s increased ‘actorness’ in 
policing and its increased involvement in prioritising major threats in Europe and in framing 
initiatives to counter these threats. Nevertheless, they argue that Europol’s role as a counter-
terrorism actor remains limited compared to other parts of its efforts, as reluctance remains from 
MSs in this area and a significant involvement of national agencies remains in policing this 
security concern (Rozée et al 2013: 378). In this sense, Europol is facing a crucial challenge in 
relations to other agencies within the field and in building confidence and trust in its competencies 
from the MSs. 
Deflem further argues that Europol’s counter-terrorism operations are constrained by the 
bureaucratisation of policing, as it is situated between the duality of political control over its 
organisation via the EU’s regulative bodies on the one hand, and the institutional autonomy of the 
participation of national police agencies, on the other (2006: 336). Nevertheless, Deflem (2006: 
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337, 353) argues that Europol still possess important features of professional expertise and that the 
Europeanisation of international counter-terrorism has significantly increased with the removal of 
the internal borders of the EU, extending the need for developing shared capabilities and 
cooperation within the field. It is evident from the literature that Europol has faced significant 
challenges in garnering support and participation from other agencies and the literature has 
predominantly focused on this challenge, the limitations of Europol and finally the evolution of 
Europol’s mandate and policies. Yet, the recency of Europol’s new venture into tackling the role 
of the Internet in radicalisation remains unexplored. Furthermore, the theoretical focus 
predominantly on bureaucratisation theory and European integration have been insufficient in 
accounting for the development of Europol’s policies in directions beyond the trajectory proposed 
by the EU and supported by the MSs, in terms of its prioritisation of threats, not deemed central at 
the national or EU level. In deploying the concept of professionals of (in)security, as put forward 
by Didier Bigo (2008), the present literature’s limitations in accounting for the development of 
Europol, the impact of the field on its position in security and its new efforts in terrorism and 
radicalisation on the Internet will be accounted for. This theoretical focus will seek to explain the 
emphasis on the threat of the Internet in radicalisation, the creation of capabilities to target this 
threat and the underlying conditions within Europol and within the field driving this development. 
The Internet in terrorism and radicalisation 
The role of the Internet in the perceived proliferation of terrorism and in radicalising the so-called 
vulnerable youth of Europe is a contested component of counter-radicalisation. From the 
perspective of the professionals of security and the law enforcement agencies, the perceived threat 
of the Internet is high and a central area of countering further terrorist acts and radicalisation of 
domestic citizens. Some scholars support this account of the threat of the Internet to international 
security in the context of terrorism and radicalisation. Michael (2014) argues for the perceived 
danger of lone-wolf terrorism, the so-called “leaderless resistance” and the need for deploying a 
counter-terrorism strategy to counter this. He argues for the threat of technology, new media and 
the Internet in radicalisation (Michael 2014: 49). The proliferation of homegrown terrorists with 
the use of the Internet in recruitment and in propaganda with little effort and great difficulty for 
states to predict attacks or prevent, their occurrence is argued to indicate a significant threat to 
security  (Michael 2014: 49). Establishing counter-radicalisation policies to counter the process of 
radicalisation and to establish counter-narratives, using new media and the Internet, is argued to be 
“the most effective approach to countering the threat of lone-wolf terrorism” (Michael 2014: 50). 
This rather pessimistic view of radicalisation and the threat of the Internet, albeit acknowledging 
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that “it is unlikely that terrorists will completely self-radicalize” online and that the occurrence of 
lone wolf terrorism is more often “the exception than the rule”, still presents a policy-centric focus 
on radicalisation and the Internet (Michael 2014: 51, 53). Furthermore, Edwards & Gribbon 
(2013) argue that unearthing the mechanisms which lead to radicalisation has yet to be 
successfully executed in academia. They explore the ways in which the Internet plays a role in the 
process of radicalisation and encourage policymakers to focus their attention on the way online 
extremist content is used in radicalisation (Edwards & Gribbon 2013: 40). They address the 
uncertainty surrounding the role of the Internet in the process of radicalisation and the academic 
divide over whether the internet is of great significance in radicalisation or rather plays an 
insignificant role (Edwards & Gribbon 2013: 41). 
Nevertheless from an academic standpoint a growing skepticism has emerged on the actual threat 
of the Internet and of the legitimacy of the actions pursued by national and EU policymakers on 
surveillance and infringement of the Internet and the privacy of its citizens. Benson (2014) 
examines the causal links between the Internet and the occurrence of terrorism, to demonstrate that 
the fear of the Internet in making the threat of terrorism stronger is not necessarily grounded in 
empirical evidence. The perceived threat of the Internet is argued to have led to the establishment 
of new bureaucracies and laws that are 'expensive, far reaching, and intrusive' in the pursuit of 
countering this proclaimed threat (Benson 2014: 294). Benson argues that 'terrorists are no more 
able to complete attacks with the Internet, than without it’ (Benson 2014: 295-296). Benson is 
critical of the argument for the Internet as a catalyst in radicalisation and in leading to homegrown 
terrorism (2014: 316). Finally, Brown & Korff (2009) are critical of the development of new 
surveillance capabilities and the increased legal powers of law enforcement and intelligence 
agencies over the Internet in the name of national and international security. They argue that the 
increased surveillance and profiling of terrorism suspects is disproportionate in its nature and 
poses clear infringements on the fundamental rights of EU citizens. They further argue that 
policing and intelligence agencies have successfully lobbied for new legal powers and capabilities 
in the surveillance of the Internet. The argument is thus, that in response to the phenomenon of 
terrorism, states and the EU feel obliged to take drastic actions in derogation of usual human rights 
obligations beyond what would be pursued in a state of stability (Brown & Korff 2009: 120). 
Terrorism thereby results in a discourse of emergency and extraordinariness of the situation, 
which provides a foundation for pushing policies moving beyond the usual and accepted methods, 
in remedying the situation. Brown & Korff argue that these policies, powers and new technologies 
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in the hands of law enforcement agencies pose threats to privacy and allow for an unprecedented 
control of the state over citizens' lives (2009: 125). Policies of the Internet in radicalisation and 
terrorism has hence taken on a life of its own and the perceived threat argued by agencies within 
the field has driven new and extensive initiatives targeting suspect communities in countering this 
notion of threat. 
The literature review provides a foundation on which to further build the analysis on Europol’s 
prioritisation of the Internet threat in terrorism and radicalisation. The event-driven nature of 
threat prioritisation and the impact of the state of emergency on legitimising policies needs to be 
accounted for. The targeting and framing of suspect communities within society as a consequence 
of the pre-emptive nature of counter-radicalisation efforts, is a significant consequence of this 
threat perception and policy development. Finally, pursuing a theoretical framework accounting 
for the field effects, the effects of other agencies within the field, as well as the influence of the 
professionals of politics is necessary in answering the main research question. 
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3. Theoretical framework 
This thesis seeks to answer the research question: ‘Why is Europol spearheading the creation of 
an EU Internet Referral Unit?’  In answering this question, the analysis will build on the theory of 
professionals of (in)security put forward by Didier Bigo (2008). The transnationalisation, or more 
appropriately the Europeanisation of the process of securitisation occurs within an IR context of 
multiple levels, actors, agencies and conditions, in which security threats and new policies and 
initiatives are produced to counter these threats. Didier Bigo puts forward two “instruments of 
analysis” to account for the globalisation of securitisation and for the development of illiberal 
practices to counter this insecurity namely, the field of professionals of security and the ban-
opticon dispositif (Bigo 2008: 11). These two instruments will be deployed to expose the field 
effects on the development of Europol within international security, the emergence of its 
newfound prioritisation of the threat of the Internet, and the legitimising elements of the threat and 
the policy development of the IRU. 
Within the field of security, the professionals of security relate to one another and to professionals 
outside of the field, most significantly the professionals of politics in the process of securitisation 
(Bigo 2008: 11). These agents, which include professionals of criminal policing, customs, 
detection and surveillance of human activities, protection and counter-terrorism, prioritise threats 
in correlation with their professionals and possible available policy options (Bigo 2008: 12). The 
Europeanisation of security and the increased integration between internal and external security is 
by Bigo not argued to result in a homogenisation of priorities and practices, but rather to the 
“continuation of struggles and differentiation at another level” (Bigo 2008: 12). The 
Europeanisation of the field of security is thus considered to provide a growth in the struggle of 
who gets to define security threats and for agencies claiming to possess the expertise and know-
how on security and threats, in profiling potential risks. (Bigo 2008: 12). Within this struggle, the 
professionals of security through their perceived authority and expertise claim their capacity to 
prioritise security threats and determine policy solutions to ensure security (Bigo 2008: 12). In the 
struggle for establishing the legitimate causes of insecurity, the professionals of security are 
argued to pursue a strategy of overstepping national borders in establishing international alliances 
to “reinforce the credibility of their assertions” (Bigo 2008: 12-13). The symbolic power gained 
through the pooling of intelligence and resources for agencies through the Europeanisation of 
security enables these agencies to eventually openly advocate particular prioritisation of threats 
and security measures (Bigo 2008: 13). The Europeanisation of the processes of securitisation thus 
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result in tensions within the bureaucratic links between the professionals of politics and the 
professionals of security, as international networks and agencies emerge transcending national 
borders and centralising the prioritisation of threats within the field (Ibid.). The field can thus be 
understood as the context in which the professionals of security within policing and intelligence 
agencies exist in and where the dominant prioritisation of security threats, security solutions and 
the exclusion of alternative narratives are produced (Bigo 2008: 14). The field is then considered a 
central component in understanding the pre-existing conditions and underlying effects influencing 
the role of an agency, such as Europol within international security. 
3.1 The Field of professionals of the security 
The field of professionals of security is a central component on the processes of securitisation, yet 
remains a largely overlooked object of analysis. Rather, the police, military and intelligence 
agencies are often perceived as “the obedient executors and zealous servants of the state” and are 
thus under analysed (Bigo 2008: 15). Yet, the notion of professionals of security challenges this 
account, as the transnationalisation of security and the removal of boundaries between the internal 
and external security condition independent narratives and perceptions to occur within the 
interaction with other agencies (Bigo 2008: 16). The field thereby opens up a space for struggles 
between these professionals of security and for the implications of their particular situation within 
the field on their respective prioritisation of threats and narratives (Bigo 2008: 17). The 
consequences of the field is thus that the professionals within it are tasked with preventing crime 
in a pro-active way and causes the creation of illiberal and targeted practices towards perceived 
threats, particularly those tied to suspect communities, rather than threats founded on empirical 
evidence (Bigo 2008: 19). On the foundation of the agencies’ perceived expertise, intelligence and 
legitimacy, the professionals of security interact with the professionals of politics and other 
agencies within the field in establishing security threats (Bigo 2008: 21). This development of 
policing and surveillance policies and initiatives are thus pursued with the ambition of policing the 
“at risk” rather than legitimate threats (Bigo 2008: 22). The field and the conditions within which 
Europol as an agency exists can thus be argued to shape how new policy are developed and for the 
development of Europol as an actor within the field. 
In order to fully account for the impact of the field on the securitisation process and on the 
agencies within it and their prioritisation of threats, Bigo sets forward four dimensions of the field. 
1. the field as a field of force, 2. the field as a field of struggle, 3. the field as a field of domination 
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and finally 4. the field as a transversal field. These four dimensions will be deployed within the 
analysis to account for the field effects on Europol and its recent policy developments. 
3.1.1 The field as a field of forces 
The field functions as a field of forces exerting pressure on the agencies within it, as these 
agencies by nature possess similar bureaucratic interests, means of collecting knowledge and 
intelligence, and similar ways of defining the potential enemy and security threats (Bigo 2008: 
24). The agencies within the field socialise in their interaction, leading to a degree of homogeneity 
in their narratives and prioritisation of threats in order to maintain the legitimacy of their positions 
and their priorities within the field, and in their relations to agents outside of the field, particularly 
the professionals of politics in order to maintain their position (Ibid.). This effect of the field limits 
the options of defining threats and in pursuing diverse policies within the field. This effect thus 
represents the constraints of the field on the possibilities of threat prioritisation, policies and 
initiatives for the individual agency. 
3.1.2 The field as a field of struggles 
Yet, the field also functions as a field of struggles, wherein the agencies with their differentiated 
budgets, resources, goals and ambitions seek to position themselves (Bigo 2008: 24). Competition 
amongst agencies is thus inevitable, as they maintain similar interests and sense of the game 
(Ibid.). Thus, in order to maintain their position within the field and in order to differentiate 
themselves from other agencies in the field, they will pursue tactics and initiatives to strengthen 
their position to determine the legitimate security threats and security solutions (Ibid.). Yet, any 
action undertaken by one agency to strengthen its position has consequences for all other agencies 
in the field (Ibid.). The effect of the field of struggles is thus fundamental in understanding the 
internal makeup of the field, the interaction between agencies, and the resistance by agencies to 
extend the position of another agency at the expense of other agencies (Bigo 2008: 24). Within the 
field, the police, military and intelligence agencies struggle over the prioritisation of threats and 
security solutions, as this prioritisation can extend symbolic power or authority to agents seeking 
to reposition themselves within the field (Ibid.). The prioritisation of a new security threat must 
then be seen in the light of the political and self-enforcing interests of the agent promoting the 
threat and account for the resistance of other agencies to accept this prioritisation (Bigo 2008: 24). 
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3.1.3 The field as a field of domination  
The field further functions as a field of domination against other fields, including the field of the 
professionals of politics. The field and the agencies within it, seek to monopolise the authority to 
legitimately define security threats (Bigo 2008: 25). The agents of the field fight for the power to 
impose their notion of threats, and in doing so, compete with the field of the professionals of 
politics to determine threats and policies (Ibid.). The field thus consists of a variety of public and 
private bureaucracies, political intermediaries and groupings that interact in shaping a security-
oriented perception of threats. The agents within the field exercise its authority over the perception 
of threat though the notion of its expertise and the perceived supplementary knowledge only 
possessed by these professionals of intelligence and policing. This expertise perception is 
reaffirmed throughout the field and within everyday routines, as a legitimising force. In this sense, 
the field is a bureaucratic field consisting of experts with the capacity to frame threats and security 
measures more accurately and grounded in their expertise, above those of the professionals of 
politics (Bigo  2008: 25-26). These policing and intelligence agencies maintain an interest in 
maintaining the recognition and support of the politicians who retain the power to abolish or 
reform these agencies (Ibid.). Thus the agencies struggle to maintain the recognition and support 
of the professionals of politics for its survival. In this sense, the effect of the field of domination is 
the particular positioning of agents towards the professionals of politics in maintaining the 
indispensability of the agency, its expertise and legitimate prioritisation of threats. 
3.1.4 The field of (in)security as a transversal field 
The transversality of the field describes the space beyond national boundaries that characterises 
the interaction between agents of the field deployed at a level not reducible to the national political 
field, the level between two states or even the European level (Bigo 2008: 28). The field is thus 
constructed as a result of the “differentiated positions of different security agencies within MSs, in 
their national context and the transnational networks between agents, both horizontally and within 
structures like Europol (Ibid). The field thus exist beyond state boundaries and establishes forms 
of collaboration between agencies previously in limited contact (Bigo 2008: 29). The interaction 
between police and intelligence agencies thereby moves operations beyond the boundaries of the 
state and maintains operations at this transnational level. Within this interaction and in agencies 
positioning themselves within the field, competition occurs between agencies, compelling them to 
focus on new forms of security stretching between the internal and external domains of security 
(Ibid.). In honing in on a new and specific struggle within the field, an agency can push the 
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boundaries of the field outwards and strengthen the position of the individual agency within the 
field. Thus, the prioritisation of the threat of the Internet by Europol occurs within the 
transversality of the field in driving threat prioritisation towards underdeveloped security concerns 
in attempts to strengthen the power and position of the agency. 
These four components of the field of the professionals of security portray the constraints and 
possibilities of the field on the agency and presents a theoretical framework for understanding 
Europol’s recent threat prioritisation. In sum, analysing the field within which Europol exists, will 
provide an understanding of the field effects on the agency within its role in the process of 
securitisation and open up the possibility to analyse what effect the field has on the prioritisation 
of threats and the promotion of new targeted solutions to these threats. The effects of the field 
brings forward the following hypotheses for the analysis.   
 H1: The field constraints and affects Europol’s prioritisation of threats and policies 
H2: Europol is spearheading the development of an EU Internet Referral Unit to reposition itself 
within the field and the prioritisation of the Internet is the sole means of achieving this 
3.2 Ban-Opticon Dispositif  
The collection of effects of the field mentioned above is not solely the byproduct of the processes 
and relations of agents within the field. It is also tied into the relationship between agents and 
other fields. These are shaped by the dispositif that cross between agencies. The undertaking of 
escalated mass surveillance and policies targeting security threats are argued by Bigo to be the 
consequence of various political processes between agencies and the professionals of politics in 
the mobilisation of this threat perception in order to strengthen the Europeanisation of mass 
surveillance (2008: 31). The ban-opticon thereby opens up the possibility of analysing the 
heterogenous and transversal practices and functions of securitisation at the transnational level 
(Ibid.). It enables the analysis of discourses by heterogenous bodies on threats, of institutions, of 
operational structures, of laws on terrorism and radicalisation and of administrative measures 
(2008: 31-32). Bigo argues that new initiatives of surveillance are not concerned with the 
surveillance of everyone, but rather the surveillance of a minority of people, while the majority is 
normalised and that this is the tendency of the current field of policing (2008: 31). Despite of the 
rhetoric of total surveillance, the ban-opticon is deemed to convey this targeted control and 
surveillance of minority groups at a distance (2008: 32). The ban-opticon possess three key 
dimensions; the exceptionalism of power, the exclusion of certain groups and pro-active 
governmentality and finally the normalisation of the non-excluded, most notably through the 
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promotion of free movement (2008: 32). In analysing the position and development of a specific 
agency within the field of security, in this case Europol, the ban-opticon dispositif can be 
considered the legitimising force behind its prioritisation of threats on the one hand, and accounts 
for the particular development of new measures of surveillance and policing on the other, as 
conditioned by the field and the agency’s preferences. 
3.2.1 Exceptionalism 
The exceptionalism of power refers to the interconnection of the production of ‘special’ laws and 
their symbolic legitimising effect, such as a state of emergency, exceptional measures and crises, 
as well as how citizens are socialised to accept these measures in order to regain security. The 
exceptionalism creates a sense of ‘permanent state of emergency’, in which new policies and 
initiatives are legitimised through discourses and narratives of threat and security (2008: 33). The 
uncertainty of insecurity establishes voids from which agencies can profit in practice in redefining 
threats to security and in moving the boundaries of the field outwards (2008: 34). This particular 
form of exceptionalism leads to new, and by Bigo considered illiberal practices. The 
exceptionalism thereby legitimises policies and initiatives not previously accepted by the field, by 
other agencies, by the professionals of politics nor by the citizens within the realm of security. 
3.2.2 Exclusion and pro-active governmentality  
The second trait of the ban-opticon is the ability to construct new categories of excluded people 
connected to the management of life. The exaggeration of particular threats concerning the risks of 
suspect communities, may thereby lead to a retargeting of policing and surveillance through the 
use of technologies and shared databases (2008: 35). This exclusion of particular groups in society 
deemed “at risk”, aims to act before an offence is committed, by collecting information oriented 
towards repressive action and by anticipating the behaviour of dangerous individuals or groups 
(Bigo 2008: 36). Prevention is thereby no longer about the committing of an act itself, but the 
‘signal’ that an offence might possibly be committed by an individual or a group that potentially 
represents a risk. The dispositif, that is, “the strategic function of the control and surveillance of 
certain selected groups of people exempted from the majority”, hinges on the field of security and 
the professionals of security and is composed of both the narrative aspect of exceptionalism and 
the policies and initiatives targeted the excluded (2008: 37). The ban-opticon dispositif thereby 
produces a perception of knowledge on threats and security aimed at pro-active 
prevention ,justifying new and expanded practices (2008: 37-38). The link between the practices 
of the professionals of security and the systems of justification of their activities are thus central to 
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the analysis. The exclusionary and pro-active element of the dispositif presents a foundation on 
which to understanding the specific prioritisation of the role of the Internet in radicalisation by 
Europol. The europeanisation of the securitisation process creates a void for agencies such as 
Europol to “act as a kind of stock exchange of threats, fears and unease and of their management”, 
and the transnationalisation of practices and notions of threat are thereby deemed more dangerous 
and legitimate (2008: 38). In deploying the notion of the ban-opticon dispositif on a single agency 
within the field, in this case Europol, will highlight the legitimizing factors supporting the framing 
of threats and finally the exclusionary and pro-active nature of the initiatives aimed at targeting the 
perceived threat. These components of the prioritisation of threats legitimises their formulation to 
the professionals of politics and its citizens, while targeting specific parts of society in the 
exclusionary elements of such policies. 
In sum, the theoretical framework on the professionals of security, the effect of the field and of the 
ban-opticon dispositif provides a perspective on the prioritisation and the securitisation process, on 
the role of Europol within the field and for its recent securitisation of the Internet. These factors 
are thus argued to constrain and affect Europol’s possible threat prioritisation and provide the 
foundation on which to account for the development of the IRU, as this is argued to be the sole 
viable opportunity for Europol to extend its position within the field against the threat of terrorism 
and radicalisation. In mobilising these concepts, this argument will be put forward. 
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4. Research Design 
4.1 Method of Analysis 
The empirical research of this study will rely on two key methodologies to supplement the 
theoretical framework applied in the analysis. First of all, it will deploy a Critical Discourse 
Analysis, following the approach of Jorgensen & Phillips (2002) to analyse the presence of 
discourse and threat and securitisation narratives within Europol and in its development of the EU 
IRU. It entails both a technique for analysing texts and for placing discourse and narratives within 
its socio-political context. Jorgensen & Phillips are critical of solely linguistic approaches of 
textual analysis of discourse, as it is deemed too simplistic and insufficient to “shed light on the 
links between texts and societal and cultural processes and structures” (Jorgensen & Phillips 2002: 
66). The combination of textual and socio-political analysis provides another layer to the 
understanding of political discourse and narratives, through analyzing the role of discourse on 
policymaking and perceptions of the terrorist threat within political speech acts, legitimisation 
processes and policymaking. This entails the analysis of discourses and narratives independently 
and in relation to the context within which they are produced. Emphasis is placed on 
intertextuality - that is -  “how an individual text draws on elements of other texts” (Jorgensen & 
Phillips 2002: 7, 73), which is crucial in analysing the prioritisation of threat narratives concerning 
the Internet within Europol and its efforts towards an EU IRU. Discourses and narratives are 
argued to be in a dialectical relationship with other social practices and dimensions, as “it does not 
just contribute to the shaping and reshaping of social structures, but also reflects them” (Jorgensen 
& Phillips 2002: 61). Here the importance of recognising the legitimising aspect of the narratives 
on the process of securitisation becomes evident (Jorgensen & Phillips 2002: 69). The discourses 
and narratives of threat and security will indicate how the importance and indispensability of 
Europol is framed, how the threats are framed and how the policy development is carried out and 
legitimised. Acknowledging the presence of narratives will establish the foundation for further 
analysing and understanding the policymaking process for Europol within the field. 
Secondly, a detailed process tracing of the securitisation process is necessary to supplement the 
discourse analysis and in order to account for the causal links between the professionals of 
security and the security field, and the development of Europol’s prioritisation of the Internet 
threat in radicalisation. The research deploys a sociological approach in accordance with the 
theoretical framework on professionals of security and embed the analysis of narratives within this 
sociological reading of the creation of the IRU. The focus will thus be less so on the technicality 
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of what is being done with the making of the IRU, and rather on who is doing it, why they are 
doing it and how they are doing it, in terms of framing the threat and in promoting policy 
measures to counter it (Jeandesboz 2007: 391). By analysing the process of policy formation and 
the role played by the field, the professionals of security, and the professional of politics in this 
process, will highlight how Europol is positioning itself in the field, in promoting particular 
narratives of threat and security, and policies to target these perceived threats. Analysing these, as 
well as the role of Europol in prioritising initiatives within its mandate and in expanding its 
capabilities will provide evidence for the argument advanced. 
4.2 Data Collection 
The data collected over the course of research for this thesis consists of a combination of various 
official policy documents from the European Union, the MSs and Europol on radicalisation, the 
role of the Internet and on the drafting of the IRU. Furthermore, press releases, communications, 
public statements, and committee hearing transcripts from Europol and the key actors within the 
organisation, as well as yearly European Union Terrorism Situation and Trend Reports (TE-SAT), 
and other primary sources from Europol has been consulted in the analysis. These are 
predominantly documents published within the last 3 years, with the bulk of them from 2015, in 
order to provide sufficient evidence and material for the making of the EU IRU, a process which 
only started in January 2015. The data has been chosen on the grounds of the emphasis on 
Europol’s evolving role, Europol’s attempts at advocating for a greater position within the field, 
and documents specifically addressing the threat of the Internet in terrorism and radicalisation. 
This collection of data provides the foundation for the analysis of discourse and narratives within 
Europol on the threat of the Internet. Furthermore, it will provide the foundation for the analysis of 
Europol, the field effects, and in accounting for the influence of the professionals of security, as 
argued by the theoretical framework. Additionally, an expert interview supplements the 
sociological approach. The conducted interview with Mr. Sablattnig, advisor to the EU Counter-
Terrorism Coordinator, accounts for EU and MSS perspectives on Europol, the threat of the 
Internet and the development of the IRU. A major challenge has been evident, as a consequence of 
the recency of the development of the IRU, the lack of a finished policy and the secrecy 
surrounding with the making of such a referral unit, in terms of gaining detailed information on 
the making of the IRU and the internal workings of Europol at the moment. This has posed a 
significant challenge in gaining expert interviews from within Europol, and the field in general, on 
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the development of the IRU, which is to be expected at the present time, yet must be accounted for 
in drawing conclusions from this analysis and in further research on this issue. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Olivia Bebe  Page 29 of 46 
5. Analysis 
5.1 The Field 
The first component of the analysis seeks to address the effects of the field of security in 
constraining the position of Europol within the process of securitisation. This examines the 
circumstances in which Europol operates and leads to an explanation of the pre-existing conditions 
shaping the limits of possibility of its threat prioritisation and for its further development of its 
capabilities. The field of security within Europe consists of various overlapping agencies and 
actors with independent interests, motivations and policy preferences, of which Europol is just one 
agency interacting with other national and transnational actors and institutions within the field. 
The field has four distinct effects on the agency and the process of threat prioritisation, as put 
forward in the theoretical framework. All of which will be accounted for to show the full field 
effects on Europol’s threat perception and policy development. This section aims to show how the 
security field and other agencies within it have affected and constrained Europol, its policies and 
perception of threat. In pursuing its new prioritisation of the threat of the Internet in radicalisation, 
Europol is seeking to reposition itself within the field and establish its indispensability for other 
agencies and for the professionals of politics. The field as such constrains Europol’s prioritisation 
of threats and conditions it towards pursuing under-explored threats to reposition itself within the 
field. 
5.1.1 The field as a field of forces  
The agencies within the security field possess a certain degree of homogeneity of priorities and 
narratives through their interaction, in framing security threats and in collectively legitimising the 
significance of the field towards other fields, particularly the professionals of politics. As a result 
of the similar bureaucratic interests and similar ways of defining security threats, the agencies to a 
large extend possess similar capabilities and a common interest in sustaining the field. In this 
sense, Europol as all other agencies, is continuously seeking to extend its position within the field 
and to gain more power and capabilities to counter security threats. As such, Europol possess 
capabilities within a wide range of policy areas, ranging from money laundering, cybercrime, 
organised fraud over smuggling of people, intelligence and counter-terrorism efforts, on par with 
other agencies in the security field (Europol 2014a: 10). Yet, despite of these shared policy 
focuses and somewhat similar capabilities, Europol is contrary to national intelligence and 
policing agencies, constrained further by its structure, limited mandate and relative lack of power 
within the field (Hillebrand 2011: 501). Europol has not been granted any supranational powers by 
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the MSs and significantly lack an overall authoritative mandate, it is thus limited from engaging in 
any operational capabilities on the issue of counter-terrorism and counter-radicalisation.  The 
evolution of Europol’s mandate and its operational capabilities have not been extended to a great 
extent in the area of counter-terrorism and counter-radicalisation (Occhipinti 2015: 240; Bures 
2011: 103) As a consequence, Europol’s activities are restricted to, acting as a facilitator for the 
exchange of information and intelligence; providing operational analysis in support of operations; 
generating yearly threat assessments based on intelligence and information supplied by MSs; 
providing expertise and technical support for investigations carried out within the EU, under the 
supervision and legal responsibility of the MSs (Europol 2007; Bures 2011: 103). This establishes 
a clearly constrained role for Europol on account of its top-down creation under the EU and limits 
its autonomy in determining specific threats and initiatives, as it requires the support of the EU 
and MSs in extending its mandate (Bures 2008: 501). Despite attempts to extend Europol’s 
operational role and a greater degree of autonomy in pursuing new endeavours, Europol’s role 
remains limited to supporting MSs activities above possessing operational capabilities on its own 
in counter-terrorism and counter-radicalisation (Occhipinti 2015: 239; Svendsen 2011: 527). 
Beyond this and besides some extensions for Europol in counter-terrorism initiatives, such as two 
Analysis Work Files (AWFs), Hydra and Dolphin dealing with islamic fundamentalist terrorism 
and other terrorist groups in Europe, respectively. Europol has largely been tasked with the 
production of the TE-SAT reports and facilitating the First Response Network, a network for 
national and Europol counter-terrorism experts (Bures 2011: 88-90). As such, despite similar 
interests and largely similar prioritisation of threats across agencies up until recently, Europol is 
further constrained within the field by its limited mandate, capabilities and power in countering 
terrorism within the field. This limits Europol’s possibility to position itself within the field and 
demands the use of its pre-existing capabilities to frame new threats on which to further its 
position (Rozée et al. 2013: 377-378; den Boer 2014: 60). 
5.1.2 The field as a field of struggles 
Competition amongst agencies within the field occur over the distribution of power and the 
position to assert security threats. The repositioning of one agency impacts all other agencies 
within the field. As such, the attempts by Europol to reposition itself within the field of security 
has been challenged by the resistance of national security agencies, despite of the mostly 
consistent political support from the MSs and EU for its role in European security (Fägersten 
2010: 505; den Boer 2015: 404). The EU has on several occasions extended the mandate of 
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Europol since its creation in general, and furthermore in the field of counter-terrorism, yet  
reluctance remains from other agencies for pooling intelligence and policing efforts within its 
structure (Hillebrand 2011: 501; Occhipinti 2015: 237). The EU’s JHA ministers have on several 
occasions urged national police authorities and intelligence services to pool intelligence within 
Europol in countering the threat of terrorism, yet progress in this area has continued to be slow 
and inefficient (Fägersten 2010: 505; den Boer 2015: 404). This has resulted in significant ebb and 
flow patterns in Europol’s role within the field, as capabilities have been implemented within its 
framework in the aftermath of attacks or security threats, that have later been shut down or 
removed, like the Counter-Terrorism Task Force created in the immediate aftermath of 9/11, only 
to be shut down a year later (Europol 2002). This, alongside other initiatives, have by some been 
argued to be the result of lack of support and proliferation of intelligence by national agencies 
(Bures 2006: 60; Europol 2002). The national intelligence services have remained reluctant to 
accept Europol’s emerging role within the field and have to a large extent disregarded the duty of 
intelligence sharing, as Europol remains unable to enforce this (European Commission 2004). This 
reluctance and lack of trust towards Europol manifests itself in predominant preferences for 
alternative and pre-existing structures and networks for cooperation for these agencies, 
particularly in the field of intelligence sharing and in matters regarding national security and 
terrorism (den Boer 2014: 52; Svendsen 2011: 530; Fägersten 2010: 502). Europol’s continued 
repositioning within the field in order to extend its capabilities within counter-terrorism is resisted 
by the other agencies in the field, as it challenges the status quo. This constrains Europol’s ability 
to extend its capabilities, as it relies on the provision of intelligence by the national agencies to 
frame security threats (Bures 2011: 103-104). The threat the repositioning of Europol poses to the 
national agencies has led to their public voicing of concerns over the capabilities of Europol in 
handling intelligence and fears over leaks in entrusting nationally obtained intelligence onto it 
(Svendsen 2011: 532; House of Lords 2008: 24). The lack of support left Europol in a more 
modest and mostly supportive role in counter-terrorism, as its initial operational endeavours were 
unsuccessful (Europol 2008). Europol is thus deemed to “not perform any indispensable 
counterterrorism functions at the moment” by most of the national intelligence and police agencies 
(Bures 2008: 498; Rozée et al. 2013: 373). The competition amongst agencies, has thereby 
constrained Europol’s positioning within the field and for years limited its ability to extend its 
capabilities and prioritisation of threats within the field.  
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5.1.3 The field as a field of domination 
Beyond seeking to strengthen Europol’s position within the security field, despite of the resistance 
of national agencies, it further seeks to position itself towards other fields, particularly the 
professionals of politics. Europol depends on the support of the EU and the MSs for its continued 
role within security and for legitimising its framing of threats. This conditions Europol to promote 
its indispensability to the EU through promoting its expertise and significance beyond that of the 
national agencies. Europol continues to aspire to become ‘the EU centre for law enforcement 
expertise’ and for positioning itself as a key actor in counter-terrorism on its own accord. It has 
sought to achieve this through several focus areas, in this case notably in building its capacity “to 
fight violent extremism and terrorism by augmenting its current initiatives on terrorist financing, 
radicalisation-awareness and monitoring of the Internet for terrorist activity” (Europol 2010: 14; 
Europol 2012a: 25-30). In seeking to grow its autonomous operational capabilities, the focus on 
areas lacking strong territorial basis, with a clear transnational nature and consequently less 
sensitive to national sovereignty, is argued to be the ideal starting ground for Europol to advance 
its own operational capabilities (Occhipinti 2015: 256). Europol has sought more recently to 
increase its capabilities on the role of the Internet in radicalisation and terrorism beyond the CtW 
presently in place. Europol already possessed some degree of expertise and operational 
capabilities within the area of cyber space, though solely focused on cybercrime, such as 
“combating child sexual exploitation, payment card fraud and cybercrime and support of EU law 
enforcement cybercrime operations” (Europol 2015a: 4, 9; Bakker 2015: 296). In addition to the 
by Europol argued success of CtW, its European Cybercrime Centre (EC3), which possesses 
“advanced technical capabilities in cyber- intelligence gathering, forensic analysis and big data 
analysis” is advocated to collectively present a unique position of expertise for Europol, both in 
terrorism with CtW and on the cyber dimension of intelligence and crime with EC3 (Europol 
2015d: 4; Wainwright 2015a: 7). In advocating it’s pre-existing expertise and present capabilities 
in its framing of the threat of the Internet in radicalisation, it provides substance and support for its 
argument for the pooling of intelligence and power within its structures, which has ensured broad 
EU support and acceptance of its prioritisation of the threat of the Internet (Presidency of the 
Council of the European Union. 2015: 4; Ministers of Justice and Home Affairs Council 2015: 2). 
The focus on the Internet provides Europol with the opportunity to promote its position as a centre 
of expertise and as the agency tasked with tackling this threat, despite of this threat not being the 
central focus of counter-radicalisation policies in any EU MS (Council of the European Union 
2007: Annex II). As such, this policy development builds on Europol’s pre-existing expertise in 
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the areas of cybercrime and terrorism, and promotes the legitimacy of the formulation of threat 
and the indispensability of its role towards the professionals of politics, thereby strengthening its 
position towards these actors. 
5.1.4 The field of (in)security as a transversal field  
Beyond proving its expertise and indispensability to the EU and its MSs, the transnationalisation 
of security further conditions agencies to hone in on specific and particular security struggles, in 
order to push the boundaries of the field in terms of range of capabilities and initiatives and in 
exploiting the europeanisation of security for new initiatives to emerge. Honing in on the threat of 
the Internet and positioning itself as the agency most suitable for tackling this threat, Europol 
exploits the void in the field on this issue, in the development of efforts to counter the threat. This 
has been notable in its role in the Europeanisation of the CtW initiative in 2007, a high-security 
portal originally introduced by Germany, in which EU MSs could pool data on terrorist 
propaganda and internet chatter coordinated through Europol (Council of the European Union 
2007). This entailed the sharing of information and expertise monitoring within Europol. It was 
established to “combat the terrorist use of the internet” in radicalisation, recruitment and training 
of potential terrorists and in the transfer of information (Council of the European Union 2007: 
Annex I). Some individual Member States were already monitoring and evaluating terrorist 
websites prior to the introduction of Check the Web, yet the initiative sought to strengthen 
European cooperation and the pooling of intelligence and resources within Europol. This initiative 
was received positively and supported by smaller MSs without their own capabilities in targeting 
online terrorist content, while those MSs with independent initiatives were less inclined to engage 
with Europol’s newfound capabilities and focus on the Internet in terrorism and radicalisation 
(Sablattnig 2015). Yet, the development of CtW and the new developments towards an EU IRU  
takes the threat further to a new level, as it will move the capabilities from simply monitoring and 
collecting information with the CtW, to conducting referrals and posting a significant degree of 
operational capabilities for Europol. This presents the development of Europol’s threat 
prioritisation and the repositioning it is resulting in within the field in developing the IRU. 
Europol has in the last few years sought to advance its role within counter-radicalisation and CtW 
remains a central component of this. In building on its pre-existing initiatives and being able to 
argue for the self-proclaimed success of these pre-existing capabilities within Europol’s present 
mandate, has provided a stronger foundation for maintaining the support of the MSs for its 
prioritisation of this new threat (Wainwright 2015a). This policy prioritisation is building upon 
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Europol’s pre-existing capabilities within cybercrime and further extends the development of 
Europol’s efforts in counter-radicalisation on the Internet, as this policy area circumvents the 
sensitivity to national sovereignty previously constraining Europol’s development in counter-
radicalisation and moves beyond previous failures in extending its operational capabilities. 
Europol is thus repositioning itself in the field through this threat, as it has presented a void in 
which it is able to extend its capabilities and role without significant resistance by other agencies, 
as this presents an opportunity for Europol to prove its added value to the field. As the threat of 
the Internet is the only real applicable area for Europol to advance its capabilities and position, this 
threat prioritisation seeks to intensify and extend the sense of insecurity surrounding the role of the 
Internet in radicalisation in order to increase the position of Europol within the field. Honing in on 
this specific security threat thus presents the opportunity for Europol to increase its position 
comparative to other agencies in the field and in tapping into the security concerns of the 
professionals of politics, advance its capabilities. 
The effects of the security field on Europol and its prioritisation of threat are far-reaching. The 
field constrains the options, policies and threat perceptions of Europol, it conditions it to compete 
with national agencies for political support and causes the resistance of national agencies for the 
extension of Europol’s role despite of political support. Europol seeks to exert its domination 
towards the professionals of politics in relying on its pre-existing expertise within security and 
further in seeking to present new security threats to reposition itself within the field and extend its 
power and capabilities within the constraints of the field. Yet, the field is not the sole component 
affecting Europol’s role within the security field and in pursuing counter-radicalisation 
capabilities. In further analysing the legitimising aspect of Europol’s development of the threat of 
the Internet and the IRU to counter this threat, as well as for the pro-active and exclusionary 
nature of the IRU will supplement the account of the field effects. 
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5.2 The Ban-Opticon Dispositif 
The following component of the analysis seeks to account for the legitimising components of 
Europol’s development of the IRU and the pre-emptive  and exclusionary measures it entails for 
the creation and perpetuation of suspect communities within Europe. The Ban-Opticon 
Dispositif’s effect on Europol is then the legitimising nature of the exceptionalism of the threat of 
the Internet in developing the IRU and the exclusionary and preventive governmentality, it entails 
in terms of the targeting of suspect communities through the Europeanisation of surveillance of 
those considered “at risk” of radicalising (Bigo 2008: 31, 36). 
5.2.1 Exceptionalism 
The element of exceptionalism of power is the interconnection between ‘special’ laws and policies 
and the symbolic legitimising effect of a state of emergency, exceptional measures and crises in 
accepting these new policies (Bigo 2008: 33). A state of emergency and fear legitimises the 
creation of new initiatives through discourse and narratives of threat and security (Ibid.). These 
narratives on the threat of the Internet are critically and systematically analysed through Europol’s 
policy papers, yearly European Union Terrorism Situation and Trend Reports (TE-SAT), official 
communication, committee hearings and public statements by the key actors within Europol, most 
notably Europol Director Rob Wainwright, as he is the main external community for the agency. 
Through an analysis of the intertextuality on the threat of the Internet across the compiled sources, 
as well as an analysis of the proliferation of the threat in the aftermath of the Paris attacks, the 
impact of the exceptionalism as a legitimising effect on the policy making will be established. 
Europol’s framing of the threat of the Internet has been slowly emerging over recent years, evident 
by an increasing degree of intertextuality of narratives throughout these documents and public 
statements. The narrative present within Europol’s prioritisation of the threat of the Internet 
contributes to the perception of a state of emergency, allowing for the broader acceptance of the 
development of the IRU within the field and by the professionals of politics.  
Europol’s narrative on the threat of the Internet utilises the exceptionalism of the current security 
environment and legitimises the prioritisation of this threat in its policy development. As the threat 
of the Internet is the only real applicable area for Europol to advance its capabilities and mandate 
comparative to the main factors of radicalisation, which remains outside the policy scope of a 
police cooperation agency, the Internet threat narrative seeks to extend the sense of insecurity 
surrounding the role of the Internet in radicalisation and enhancing Europol’s position within the 
field. Its framing of this threat has been slowly building in its yearly TE-SAT reports, yet not until 
the events of homegrown terrorism in Paris and Copenhagen earlier this year, did the framing of 
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the threat manifest itself in the advocacy for capabilities under Europol to address this threat. The 
last three yearly TE-SAT reports, for the years 2012, 2013 and 2014 all contain a significant 
degree of intertextuality on the framing of the threat of the Internet in terrorism and radicalisation 
(Europol 2012b; Europol 2013; Europol 2014b). The “Internet as a facilitator” for terrorism-
related activities, for radicalisation, violent extremist purposes transcend all of them (Europol 
2014: 14; Europol 2012b: 5, 10; Europol 2013b: 5). The use of “religiously inspired” online 
forums and social media use in spreading religious propaganda and in “contributing to the 
acceleration of (self-)radicalisation among EU nationals” is promoted throughout Europol’s 
discourse on the Internet (Europol 2012b: 19-20; Europol 2013b: 14; Europol 2014: 14). Thus 
Europol is further targeting suspect communities over concerns of “violent jihadist groups, such as 
the Islamic State of Iraq” in radicalising “vulnerable individuals in society” (Ibid.). The threat of 
the Internet is further framed as being “sophisticated”, “complex”, and a “dynamic phenomenon”, 
which is argued to be abused by terrorist organisations and violent extremists in “implementing 
advanced strategies” to radicalise citizens within the EU, according to the concept note on the 
creation of the IRU (Europol 2015d: 2, 4; Wainwright 2015: 4). Emphasis is placed on the 
proliferation of Twitter accounts and other social media accounts used by supporters of the Islamic 
State (ISIS) to launch social media campaigns to “recruit followers, promote or glorify acts of 
terrorism and violent extremism” (Europol 2015d: 2). Europol has thus in recent years steadily 
been advancing the notion of the threat of the Internet in terrorism and radicalisation, as this 
remains the sole applicable area for it to advance its capabilities and position within counter-
radicalisation and in the field overall. The threat is therefore inflated to highlight the legitimacy of 
the threat and the necessity of developing capabilities to counter this threat within Europol on the 
grounds of its pre-existing expertise on cybercrime and terrorism, as advocated particularly with 
the framing of the threat and the development of the IRU in 2015 (Wainwright 2015a: 1; Europol 
2015e: 37-38; Europol 2015d: 4). The threat is thus linked with the state of emergency within the 
dispositif in legitimising a sense of insecurity and the development of capabilities within Europol 
for the professionals of politics and towards its citizens. 
Moreover, this prioritisation of the threat of the Internet reached new heights in the aftermath of 
the Charlie Hebdo attacks in Paris on 7 January 2015 (Europol 2015d: 2). The attacks enhanced 
the state of emergency and enabled Europol to reprioritise the threat of the Internet and efficiently 
advocate for the development of capabilities that were previously impossible. The Charlie Hebdo 
attacks are argued by the Europol Director to have shown “that there is a threat, clearly, from 
sleeping networks, dormant networks, that suddenly can reawaken” (Wainwright 2015a: 3). The 
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attacks are equated as a “stark illustration of the terrorist threat and of inter-related factors such as 
violent extremist propaganda on the Internet and weapons trafficking (Europol 2014: 4). It 
furthermore connects ISIS “and its apparent network” in maintaining greater Internet capabilities 
and the future threat it might pose “in terms of any attacks that are conducted across the Internet” 
(Wainwright 2015a: 12). The attacks in Paris and the developing situation in Iraq, as well as the 
attacks in Copenhagen in February, are used as evidence by Europol to display the very real threat 
terrorism poses to security and in linking this threat to the role of the Internet in  the processes of 
radicalisation (Wainwright 2015b; Schultz 2015). In this sense, the narrative is less so linked with 
the actual threat the Internet poses in radicalisation and terrorism. Rather, it is tied into the future-
oriented, pre-emptive and emotionally interconnected sense of threat and insecurity in the 
immediate aftermath of attacks on EU soil, in the promotion of both this sense of insecurity and in 
Europol’s ability to manage this through the creation of the IRU. In this sense, the state of 
emergency in the aftermath of homegrown attacks within Europe as well as concerns over the 
radicalisation of citizens by ISIS’s online propaganda, legitimises Europol’s prioritisation of the 
threat of the Internet and further the development of capabilities within Europol to counter this 
threat within the field. This development thereby lead to the acceptance of policies not previously 
considered a component of the field by other agencies and the professionals of politics to counter 
this threat and supports Europol’s prioritisation of threat and repositioning within the field. 
5.2.2 Exclusion and pro-active governmentality 
Beyond the legitimising element of the exceptionalism promoted by Europol’s prioritisation of the 
threat of the Internet in radicalisation and terrorism, the creation of an EU IRU further establishes 
pro-active and pre-emptive measures, characteristic of the framing of new security threats within 
the field. This trait of the ban-opticon is its ability to construct new exclusionary measures towards 
suspect communities, through retargeting of policing and surveillance towards these communities. 
The ban-opticon dispositif thereby produces a perception of knowledge on threats aimed at pro-
active prevention, justifying new and expanded practices for the professionals of security (Bigo 
2008: 38). The specific targeting of the IRU towards violent extremism and muslim groupings 
within society, retargeting policing and surveillance towards those “at risk” of radicalising, 
through the collection of information and surveillance, in order to manage these groupings and 
deter their potential “dangerous behaviour” (Bigo 2008: 35-6; Breen-Smyth 2014: 229-230; 
Europol 2015d: 4).  
The event-driven nature of Europol’s framing of the threat of the Internet in terrorism and 
radicalisation, in the aftermath of homegrown terrorist attacks in early 2015 in Paris and 
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Copenhagen has sped up the prioritisation of the Internet threat within Europol and the 
development of its capabilities to counter this perceived threat (Schultz 2015; Europol 2015d: 4). 
In the aftermath of the Paris attacks, several new policy initiatives and directions were presented at 
the EU level by the JHA Ministers in the Joint Riga Statement on 30 January 2015 (Ministers of 
Justice and Home Affairs Council 2015). This included building on and expanding upon pre-
existing tools within the EU, in response to the terrorist threat, in updating the EU Internal 
Security Strategy, moving forward with the development the EU PNR framework, amending the 
Schengen Border Code and addressing the internet’s role in radicalisation and as a tool for 
terrorists (Ibid). All policies of which, the professionals of politics within the EU has previously 
tried and failed at gaining political will to implement at the EU level (Ministers of Justice and 
Home Affairs Council 2015; Kaunert et al. 2012: 485-7; Le ́onard 2015: 324-325). Yet, the state 
of urgency promoted after the Charlie Hebdo attacks, as well as the Copenhagen attack, opened a 
void of legitimacy in the reprioritisation of these threats within European security. These policy 
developments inside the EU framework can then all be argued to be aimed at targeting suspect 
communicates within the EU and ‘risky’ individuals entering Europe particularly Muslim 
minorities, through the policing and surveillance of these targeted groups of society (Breen-Smyth 
2014: 229-230; Europol 2012b: 4).  
The exclusionary and pro-active aspect of the dispositif, in the case of the prioritisation of the 
Internet threat and through the developments of the IRU, thereby relies on a particular perception 
of knowledge on threats and security aimed at justifying new and expanded practices to target this 
perceived threat (Bigo 2008: 38). In this sense, as a consequence of the need to prevent further 
security risks, Europol is developing the IRU under the effects of the field and in tapping into this 
particular threat perception seeks to expand policies in prevention of new security risks within the 
Internet threat. As the IRU is tasked with the flagging of terrorist and extremist content online and 
carrying out Internet referrals in cooperation with the Internet Industry, it is aimed at monitoring 
and removing online content deemed to promote terrorism and violence to create effective 
counter-narratives to tackle radicalisation of a religious nature (Council of the European Union 
2015a; Europol 2015d; Europol 2014b). The prioritisation of the Internet threat, thereby seeks to 
police and surveil the created suspect community at risk of being exposed to and radicalised by 
online content and deter citizens for using and producing extremist content online (Ibid.). 
Although the IRU is still in the developing stages, and its final setup and the overall support of 
other agencies in the field for its development, is still too early to conclude upon, the advisor to 
the EU CTC Mr. Sablattnig indicates widespread support from the professionals of politics within 
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the EU and MSs and a willingness of the agencies in the field to support Europol’s role in tackling 
the threat (Sablattnig 2015). It can thereby be argued that honing in on the pre-emptive and pro-
active nature of countering radicalisation has enabled Europol to advance its position within the 
field, to pursue this new threat prioritisation, which inexplicably drives exclusion within society in 
the attempts to counter this perceived threat.   
In sustaining the support of the professionals of politics within Europe and at least at the present 
moment seeking and achieving the acceptance of other agencies in the field for this threat 
prioritisation and capability development, thus provides Europol with the opportunity to reposition 
itself within the field in targeting the perceived threat through pre-emptive measures of Internet 
surveillance. The component of exceptionalism in the ban-opticon thereby legitimises the 
prioritisation of the threat towards other agencies in the field, to other fields and the professionals 
of politics, while the pro-active governmentality enables the promotion of initiatives countering 
the threat in the form of increased surveillance and policing measures, in this case, in the form of 
the IRU. 
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6. Conclusion  
This thesis set out to answer the research question: “Why is Europol spearheading the creation of 
an EU Internet Referral Unit?” It is argued that the field effects have constrained Europol’s 
position within the process of securitisation and in countering radicalisation. Furthermore, the 
field has conditioned Europol’s prioritisation of threats towards a policy issue traditionally 
deemed outside of the field, in this case on the Internet threat in the processes of radicalisation, in 
order to strengthen its position and power within the field and in relations to the professionals of 
politics. This threat prioritisation and capability building is thereby the only viable option for 
Europol in positioning itself in counter-radicalisation in the security field. Therefore, the effects of 
the field constrains and conditions the possible policies, capabilities and threat development for 
Europol overall and towards the threats of radicalisation. The threat of the Internet does not pose 
significant challenges to the other agencies in the field and is thus allows a smother development 
of Europol’s capabilities against this threat. The threat is further accepted by the EU and its MSs 
on the grounds of the legitimacy of Europol’s threat claims based on its pre-existing capabilities 
and the perception of the expertise of the professionals of security within the agency. 
Furthermore, the ban-opticon dispositif’s effects on the field and on Europol itself has legitimised 
the prioritisation of the threat of the Internet under the state of emergency presented by recent 
homegrown terrorist attacks in Paris and Copenhagen earlier in 2015. The consequences of this 
state of emergency is the development of narratives of threat and security legitimising new and 
expansive initiatives to pre-emptively prevent security threats within Europe. The pro-active 
element of the dispositif and the development of capabilities to target the threat of the Internet 
leads to the policing and surveillance of suspect communities within society deemed “at risk” of 
radicalising online. The repercussions of the IRU is thus a targeting and perpetuation of suspect 
communities on the grounds of their perceived risk of radicalising, rather than on the legitimate 
and evidence-based targeting of actual security threats within the EU. Through the mobilisation of 
the four dimensions of field effect and the notion of the ban-opticon dispositif, this argument has 
been advanced on the development of the EU Internet Referral Unit under Europol. These 
concepts are hence argued to have driven Europol’s prioritisation of the Internet that and the 
development of the EU IRU. 
The consequences of the recency of Europol’s new threat prioritisation and the yet to be 
completed process of operationalising the Internet Referral Unit poses several limitations to the 
present undertaking and leaves several implications for future studies of this development. It is 
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simply too early to predict the impact of this development on Europol’s position within the field, 
on the field itself and on the other agencies in the field. Despite the political will for the 
development of the IRU from both the EU and MSs’s professionals of politics, it is yet to be seen 
if this will in fact manifest itself in practical support from the national policing and intelligence 
agencies. The completion and implementation of the IRU later this year will expand our insights 
on the short and long-term consequences of this development. The state of emergency concerning 
the threat of homegrown terrorism and radicalisation is at a significant high as a consequence of 
the recent attacks and threat within Europe, thus extending the legitimacy of threat prioritisation 
within this aspect of security. It will have to be seen what consequences the IRU will have on 
suspect communities within Europe and whether it will in fact relieve the insecurity perceived of 
the Internet in radicalisation. Future research on the security field and the role of Europol within it 
and in counter-radicalisation will have to account for the impact of other agencies within the field, 
such as private businesses and the Internet industry in countering this perceived threat. As the IRU 
becomes operationalised, more insights will be discovered on the consequences it may have and 
the involvement and acceptance of the other agencies on this development, preferably also in 
opening the opportunity for expert interviews with professionals of security within Europol to 
provide greater insights on their take on threat prioritisation and the threat of the Internet in 
radicalisation. 
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